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“Parable of Debt Fairy” in Ball and Mankiw (1995), implies that a percentage point 
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1 Introduction 
 
Traditionally, an increase in budget deficits or government debt raises real interest rates. 
Nonetheless, the Japanese long-term interest rate has remained steady at 2% or less and the ex post 
inflation rate is approximately –0.3%. On the other hand, long-term debt at the central and local 
government levels is valued at ¥773 trillion, or 148% of Japan’s GDP, as of the end of FY20071. 
Do budget deficits and government debt have no effect on real interest rates? Several studies on 
the US economy have dealt with this question since Plosser (1982), a seminal study in this field2.  
The abovementioned literature can be classified into two generations in terms of their conclusions. 
The first generation literature concludes that there is no significantly positive association between 
budget deficit or government debt and interest rates, and they attribute this discussion to the 
Ricardian equivalence proposition. For instance, Plosser (1982, 1987) and Evans (1987a) reveal that 
there is no significant effect of fiscal variables on long-term interest rates on the basis of a vector 
autoregression (VAR) macroeconometric model including a rational expectations model of the term 
structure. However, Feldstein (1986), Mankiw and Laubach (1999), and Gale and Orszag (2002) 
pointed out some problems in their methodology, and the VAR method is no longer employed in this 
field. 
The second generation literature emphasizes that not the current but rather the expected budget 
deficit or government debt affects current real long-term interest rates. This generation of studies can 
be further classified into two: (1) those that use published forecasts of budget deficits as a proxy for 
market expectations (Feldstein (1986), Elmendorf (1993), Laubach (2003), Engen and Hubbard 
(2004), etc.) and (2) those that conduct event analyses of news reports or announcements pertaining 
to budget projections (Wachtel and Young (1987), Thorbecke (1993), Elmendorf (1996), etc). Both 
types of studies show that there exists a significantly positive association between projected budget 
deficits or government debt and current real long-term interest rates.  
Unfortunately, most of the abovementioned studies deal solely with the US economy. While the 
United States is the world’s largest economic power, there are at least two reasons why focus should 
be placed on Japan. First, among the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Japan has the largest debt-to-GDP ratio. This implies that it 
would be easy to ascertain the relationship between fiscal variables and interest rates if such a 
                                                  
1 Here, we use the bond yield of the newly issued 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) as the 
long-term interest rate and calculate the inflation rate from the deflator of household consumption in 
the National Accounts. The debt data is obtained from “Current Japanese Fiscal Conditions and 
Issues to be Considered,” published by the Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
(http://www.mof.go.jp/english/budget/budget.htm). Incidentally, the debt-to-GDP ratio is stated to be 
170.3% in the OECD Economic Outlook. 
2 Evans (1985), Feldstein (1986), Wachtel and Young (1987), Elmendorf (1993), Laubach (2003), etc. 
In addition, Barth et al. (1991) and Gale and Orszag (2002) have produced excellent survey studies.  
 2
relationship indeed exists. Second, in order to reinforce the findings in the abovementioned literature, 
it would be worthwhile to analyze the second largest economy in the world. 
To the best of my knowledge, only two previous studies have been conducted on the relationship 
between fiscal variables and interest rates in the Japanese economy. Nakazato et al. (2003) concludes 
that there is no such association in the economies of the eight developed countries, including Japan; 
however, he only uses current fiscal variables despite the findings of the previous literature. On the 
basis of an event analysis, Fukuda and Ji (2002) demonstrates that in the 1990s, government 
expenditure had no effect on the JGB rates. However, the target of this study was to ascertain the 
effects of Keynesian fiscal expansion.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of the budget deficits and debt of the Japanese 
central government on the real long-term interest rates in Japan. We employ the report Projection of 
the Budget’s Effects on Outlays and Revenues (predecessor: Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives) 
issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which includes published forecasts of budget deficits and 
the closing yields to maturity on 10- and 5-year JGBs as long-term interest rates. Next, we regress 
the reduced form equation developed by Laubach (2003) and estimate the magnitude of this 
association with respect to the Japanese economy. 
Our conclusions are as follows. A percentage point increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP raises 
the real 10-year interest rate by 35 basis points and the real 5-year interest rate by 42 basis points. 
Similarly, a percentage point increase in the projected debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with an 
increase of four basis points in the real 10-year interest rate and five basis points in the real 5-year 
interest rate. These results are consistent with the often-cited benchmark of the “Parable of Debt 
Fairy” in Ball and Mankiw (1995), implying that a percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio derives at most a single-digit-basis-point rise in real interest rates. It is also consistent with the 
conclusion in Feldstein (1986), that is, budget deficits have larger effects than government debt.  
 This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the previous literature and point out the 
inapplicability of the knowledge derived from international academic movements to Japanese case 
studies. In section 3, we present our empirical methodology and data, and in section 4, we provide 
our results. Finally, in section 5, we offer some conclusions.  
 
 
2 Review of Previous Studies3 
 
2.1  Brief History of the Studies 
                                                  
3 We survey only the literature in which reduced form econometric models are employed, although 
structural macroeconometric models can also be used to analyze this association. Gale and Orszag 
(2002) provides an excellent survey study concerning this point. 
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 The first study to empirically investigate the association between fiscal variables and interest rates 
is Plosser (1982). Plosser (1982) combines a rational expectations model of term structure with a 
VAR macroeconometric model and derives a reduced form equation for the closing period return on 
fiscal variables. Estimations of this reduced form with quarterly US data reveal that tax reduction 
financed by bond issues has an insignificant effect on interest rates. Plosser (1982) concludes that 
this empirical result does not support the proposition that an increase in government debt drives 
yields upward.   
Some studies have extended Plosser’s seminal study in several ways. Evans (1987a) applied his 
framework for all G7 countries barring Italy and found that tax reduction has a significant negative 
effect on interest rates in some countries. Evans (1987b) presented evidence inconsistent with the 
traditional view by testing the associations with various types of interest rates for various sample 
periods. Plosser (1987) refined Plosser (1982) to capture the effects on real interest rate and showed 
no or little association between real or nominal interest rates and deficits.  
As reviewed above, most of the previous studies in the mid-1980s find no association or a negative 
association between budget deficit and real or nominal interest rates. Basically, their reasoning is 
based on  the Ricardian view implied in Barro (1974, 1981). 
However, this view is challenged by Feldstein (1986). He states as follows: “It is wrong to relate 
the rate of interest to the concurrent budget deficit without taking into account the anticipated future 
deficits. It is significant that almost none of the past empirical analysis of the effect of deficits on 
interest rates makes any attempt to include a measure of expected future deficits.” He then derives a 
reduced form for the real interest rate on the basis of the traditional IS-LM framework. Moreover, he 
estimates it with both the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio for five subsequent years and the stock of 
government debt during the calendar year divided by the full-employment nominal GDP. 
From this estimation, he obtained the result that a percentage point increase in the expected 
deficit-to-GDP ratio raises the long-term interest rate by approximately 1.2 percentage points, while 
the ratio of current deficit-to-GDP has no significant effect. Thus, he concludes that “the evidence 
indicates that budget deficits . . . have had a strong influence on the level of long term interest rate.”  
Other critiques followed Feldstein (1986), although Plosser (1987) raised an objection to Feldstein 
(1986) to the effect that innovations in public debt are correlated with future changes in debt as 
determined through VARs. However, Mankiw and Laubach (1999) points out the poor fitness and 
poor robustness of the changes in the sample period in Plosser (1982, 1987) and Evans (1987a, 
1987b), and adjudges Plosser’s framework to have little power to measure the true effects of policy. 
In addition, Gale and Orszag (2002) explains that VAR-based projections of future deficits basically 
disregard the scheduled reductions in tax rates that are included in the previous year’s tax legislation. 
Gale and Orszag (2002) further state that VAR projections fail to incorporate information regarding 
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future events, which may be widely available to market participants. Owing to the abovementioned 
points, the vast majority of studies now avoid employing a VAR method4. 
 
2.2 Studies with Expected Future Budgetary Variables 
 
 As Gale and Orszag (2002) summarizes, there exist two types of challenges to explicitly 
incorporating market expectations in future deficits. Some studies used published forecasts from 
sources like the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as a proxy for anticipated deficits. Others 
undertake event analyses of news regarding the likelihood of deficit reduction legislation.   
 
2.2.1 Studies using Published Forecasts as a Proxy for the Expectation of Deficits and Debt 
 
Following Feldstein (1986), several studies emerged in which published forecasts are used as a 
proxy for market expectations5. Cohen and Garnier (1991) uses Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) forecasts and finds that an increase in the expected deficit equivalent to one percent of the 
GNP raises the 10-year interest rate by 53 to 56 basis points 6 . Elmendorf (1993) uses Data 
Resources, Inc (DRI) forecasts and reveals that the projected deficit has significant and large positive 
effects on medium-term Treasury yields. For example, although an increase in the projected deficit 
equivalent to one percent of the GNP raises 5-year bond yields by 43 basis points, this increase has 
insignificant effects on a long-term (20-year) Treasury rate. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002) 
uses CBO projections and studies their effects on the spread between 5-year or 10-year and 3-month 
Treasury yields. Their analysis suggests that increases in the projected future deficits averaging one 
percent of the current GDP are associated with an increase in the long-term interest rate relative to 
the 3-month yields of 53 to 60 basis points. 
                                                 
To abstract the influence of the business cycle, Laubach (2003) uses not only the current but also 
the expected five-year-ahead yield on 10-year or 5-year Treasury notes calculated on the basis of 
forward rates. In a recession, for example, automatic fiscal stabilizers raise deficits, while long-term 
interest rates fall owing to monetary intervention. A regression of the reduced form derived from the 
neo-classical model demonstrates that the forward long-term interests rise by roughly 25 basis points 
in response to a one-percent increase in the expected ratio of deficit to GDP estimated by the CBO or 
 
4 Miller and Russek (1996) and Evans and Marshall (2002) are exceptions. 
5 The descriptions in this paragraph are based on Gale and Orszag (2002), Laubach (2003), and 
Engen and Hubbard (2004).  
6 They also examine the associations among the G7 countries on the basis of OECD data and find no 
evidence of a positive and significant association between current debt or deficits and current interest 
rates. They further reveal that one-year-ahead forecasts of deficits by the OECD tend to have a 
significant negative effect on nominal short-term interest rates, in contrast to the prediction of the 
government deficit crowding-out hypothesis. 
 5
OMB, and by roughly 4 basis points in response to a one-percent increase in the expected debt-to-
GDP ratio. 
Finally, by using the Parable of Debt Fairy in Ball and Mankiw (1995), Engen and Hubbard 
(2004) analytically derives the prediction that an increase in government debt equivalent to one 
percent of the GDP increases the real interest rate by approximately two or three basis points. To test 
this hypothesis, similar to Laubach (2003), they regress the reduced form for the level of or the 
change in interest rates and find that the magnitude of the effect of the projected debt-to-GDP ratio 
on real long-term interest rates is consistent with the Parable. 
 
 As shown above, the studies using published forecasts of fiscal variables as a proxy for market 
expectations confirm that the projected budget deficit or debt has a significant positive association 
with the real long-term interest rate, although the magnitude varies. 
 
2.2.2 Studies using Event Analyses of the News of Budget Projections 
 
Although studies using published forecasts have some advantages in that we can derive the causal 
relationships between fiscal variables and interest rates from the presumed theoretical model and 
estimate the magnitude of the association, there exists a simultaneous problem arising from the 
business cycle as a result of data frequency. This problem can be overcome with the use of event 
analyses since the precedence of news can be captured in daily data, which are generally used in 
event analyses, although the magnitude of the responses may be imprecise. 
The first event analysis concerning the association between deficits and interest rates is Wachtel 
and Young (1987). Wachtel and Young (1987) define the unanticipated part of deficit provision as 
the difference between a newly-announced deficit and the previous one announced by the CBO and 
OMB as of the day that the former is announced. Controlling for monetary effects, they regress the 
reduced form for the changes that occur in the daily yields of Treasury bills of various terms on these 
innovations. Consequently, they show that an increase of $1 billion of the projected deficit leads to 
an average 0.30 basis point increase in interest rates for CBO announcements and 0.18 basis points 
for OMB announcements.  
Following Wachtel and Young (1987), several studies have investigated the remaining issues. 
Quigley and Porter-Hudak (1994) point out their oversight of certain announcements in their data 
and the possibility that they capture only temporary effects. Completing the data using the Wall 
Street Journal and employing an intervention analysis to capture the mean reversion, they find that 
the market responds to deficit announcements approximately 40 percent of the time and that the 
responses are only temporary—six days on average.  
Thorbecke (1993) examines the background of Wachtel and Young’s (1987) results. Wachtel and 
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Young (1987) offer three explanations for their findings: the crowding out of investments, the 
effects of temporary government expenditure in neo-Ricardian fashion, and the inflation caused by 
monetization. To deduce the movements of the real interest rate using economic theory, Thorbecke 
(1993) regresses the changes in exchange rates as well as those in nominal interest rates on the 
innovations. From this regression results, he demonstrates that actual markets use the crowding-out 
model and that a $100 billion increase in the deficit raises the 10-year interest rate by 14 to 26 basis 
points. 
Elmendorf (1996) focuses on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law of 1985 and the Budget 
Enforcement Act of 1990 and analyzes the developments that took place in the financial market 
following news reports concerning these deficit-reduction laws. Investigating the changes in the 
nominal interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices, and stock prices on the basis of the 
economic theory, he concludes that the larger the expected government spending and budget deficits, 
the greater the rise in real interest rates.  
 
As shown above, studies using event analysis also demonstrate that an increase in the projected 
budget deficit raises the long-term interest rate, although Quigley and Porter-Hudak (1994) points 
out that such rises are only temporary. 
 
2.2.3 Recent Topics 
 
Although it is agreed that we should incorporate expectations pertaining to fiscal variable while 
investigating the latter’s effects on real interest rates, several problems still remain.  
First, there is no consensus on the relative significance of deficits and debt. Feldstein (1986) 
insists that deficits are more important owing to the following three reasons. The first is that budget 
deficits raise aggregate demand through the resulting increase in the demand for money supply. 
Second, budget deficits cause inflation uncertainty. A sustained budget deficit would pressurize the 
monetary authority to ease the supply of money, which in turn, causes investors to anticipate future 
inflation. In contrast, the stock of debt is the accumulation of deficits that the monetary authority has 
already accepted; thus, debt provides less information about future monetary expansion. Finally, he 
points out the effects of deficits through the adjustment cost of investments. According to Hayashi 
(1982) and Abel (1980), the marginal product of capital is equal to the product of the interest rate 
and the cost of the capital including the marginal adjustment cost. Since adjustment costs are 
positively affected by investments, an increase in the budget deficit decreases marginal adjustment 
costs if the increase crowded out private investments. Therefore, an increase in the budget deficit 
raises the interest rate when the change in the marginal product of capital that is caused by the 
resulting decrease in investments is negligible.  
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On the other hand, on the basis of the Parable of Debt Fairy in Ball and Mankiw (1995), Engen 
and Hubbard (2004) insist that debt has a stronger effect on interest rates than do deficits. Imagine 
that one night, a debt fairy replaces every government bond with a piece of private capital of 
equivalent value. If we presume a neo-classical framework and the Cobb-Douglas technology, 
αα −= 1LAKY , back-of-the-envelop calculations reveal that the marginal product of capital is equal 
to the real interest rate ( ). As the debt fairy magically replaces debt with capital, 
we obtain the condition of 
αα −= 1)/( KLAr
1/ −=dDdK . Therefore, 
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 This model implies that it is debt, and not deficits, that affects real interest rates. In addition, Engen 
and Hubbard (2004) emphasizes that it is interest rate changes, and not interest rate levels, that are 
affected by the budget deficit.  
As shown above, it is unclear which one has a stronger effect on real interest rates—deficits or 
debt. We will examine this point in section 4. 
The second problem deals with the magnitude of the association between fiscal variables and 
interest rates. From equation (1), we obtain 
 
LdKdKdYdrd log)1(log)1(logloglog αα −−−=−= .  (2) 
 
Assuming that  and parameterizing 0log =Ld 117.0=r , 3.0=α , 1138=K  trillion yen adjusted 
to the Japanese economy7, an increase in government debt of one percent of Japan’s GDP, which 
equals approximately 5.1 trillion yen, is supposed to reduce the capital stock by 0.44 and raise the 
real interest rate by 5.3 basis points in this model. 
Needless to say, some assumptions are required to discuss the real economy on the basis of this 
model, such as a constant amount of private savings, a closed economy, and single determinants for 
the marginal product of capital associated with a real interest rate (Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)). 
However, since it is no longer unconventional to use the Parable of Debt Fairy as a benchmark, some 
studies are doing so. For instance, Engen and Hubbard (2004) termed this calculation a “standard 
benchmark” and utilized it as a guideline for their estimation8. 
                                                  
7 For capital stock, we use the tangible fixed assets of all the industries included in “Preliminary 
Quarterly Estimates of Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises” 
(http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/data.html). Following Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), the ex ante 
real interest rates (r) are computed as the capital share of income divided by the capital-income ratio 
minus the depreciation rate drawn from the above materials.   
8 In their calculation for the US economy, the resulting increase in real interest rates is 2.4 bps. 
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 2.3 Studies on the Japanese Economy 
 
   As shown in the previous section, almost all the preceding studies deal solely with US data. To the 
best of my knowledge, the only studies on the Japanese economy are Nakazato et al. (2003) and 
Fukuda and Ji (2002). 
Nakazato et al. (2003) analyzes the effect of fiscal variables on nominal long-term interest rates 
with respect to the G7 countries and Sweden. Moreover, budget deficits, structural budget deficits, 
primary balance, and government debt are adopted as the fiscal variables. However, unlike in the 
previous studies, these fiscal variables are measured at their current values despite the findings of the 
previous literature, and the variables are not divided by the nominal GDP. The regression results 
show an insignificant or significant negative association between the fiscal variables and long-term 
rates. Two interpretations are proposed with regard to this result: government commitment to 
consolidation is trusted by the market participants, or the time horizon of market participants is finite. 
Fukuda and Ji (2002) examine the effect of the accumulation of government debt on the 
effectiveness of fiscal expansion in the 1990s through an event study. Regressing the changes in the 
daily yields of long-term JGBs on the dummy variable representative of the announcement of fiscal 
expansion, they did not find any effect of the announcement on the long-term interest rates9. 
As shown above, there exist only two previous studies on the relationship between interest rates 
and budget deficits in the Japanese economy, and neither of them uses published forecasts. In the 
next section, we study the effects of budget deficits and debt on long-term real interest rates by using 
the published forecasts of the report Projection of the Budget’s Effects on Outlays and Revenues  
 
 
3 Methodology 
 
3.1 The Reduced Form Equation 
 
 As mentioned above, studies using published forecasts regress the reduced form equations for 
interest rates. Therefore, the selection of the independent variables and the type of economic theory 
adopted for the background of the estimation are crucial. Feldstein (1986) and Evans (1985) presume 
the traditional IS-LM framework, whereas Laubach (2003) and Engen and Hubbard (2004) employ 
the neoclassical growth model. 
                                                  
9 As explained in section 1, although the purpose of Fukuda and Ji (2002) is not determining the 
effects of budget deficits and government bond, it is worthwhile to refer to this study here because to 
the best of my knowledge, there is no study of this association on the Japanese economy that is 
based on event studies.  
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Needless to say, it is impossible to decide which framework is more suitable in advance. However, 
it would be better to utilize the neoclassical growth model, since the dependence variable is the long-
term interest rate and we use annual data in this analysis.  
 Laubach (2003) presumes the Ramsey model and estimates the following equation derived from 
the equilibrium condition of θσ += gr  ( r  = real interest rate, σ  = the degree of relative risk 
aversion, g  = growth rate of technology, θ  = rate of time preference). 
  
t
e
ttttt egfi επβββββ +++++= 43210 ,     (5) 
 
where  are the nominal interest rates; , the fiscal variable (e.g., the projected deficit-to-GDP 
ratio); , a measure of potential GDP growth; ; a measure of the equity premium discussed 
below
ti
tg
tf
te
10; and , the expected inflation rates. Note that  is employed as a control. As is evident, a 
positive significant 
e
tπ etπ
1β  implies that an increase in the budget deficit or government debt positively 
affects long-term interest rates. Following Feldstein (1986) and Engen and Hubbard (2004), we 
assume that there is no inflow or outflow of capital that offsets a change in debt11. 
 
 
3.2  Data 
 
(1) Fiscal Variables 
  
● Expected Budget Deficit 
 
For published forecasts of budget deficits, we employ the difference provided in the report 
Projection of the Budget’s Effects on Outlays and Revenues issued by the Japanese MOF (hereafter, 
referred to as the Projection; Table 1). The Projection presents the future general account budget 
expected to prevail in the next four years, and it is submitted by the MOF to the budget committee of 
the House of Representatives along with the government draft budget12. To avoid the effects of the 
business cycle, we use the 4-year-ahead forecasts (Table 2).  
There are several reasons why this source is chosen over other sources such as the OECD 
                                                  
10 See Section 3.2 for details. 
11 It should be noted that Laubach (2003) regressed not only the current but also the expected future 
interest rates on fiscal forecasts. Although the implied forward rates of JGBs are available from data 
venders like Bloomberg, they are extremely expensive. Due to budget constraints, this point is kept 
aside for future studies. 
12 The fact that we use only general account budget deficits and disregard special accounts, local 
government deficits, and so forth, is an obvious error. However, to the best of my knowledge, there 
exists no forecast for these accounts. 
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Economic Outlook. First, the Projection dates back to FY1981, and market participants are familiar 
with it. Second, the Projection provides 4-year-ahead projections, which are less affected by the 
business cycle than OECD projections, which forecast only two years ahead. Finally, as pointed in 
section 2, the previous literature employs the government’s projections as well.  
It should be noted that the meaning of difference is different from that provided in the old edition 
of the Projection. Until FY1996, the difference implied the “target” budget deficits, and not the 
expected budget deficits, which suggests that another balancer existed in the old Projection. In 
addition, even in a single yearly edition, it can be found that different projections have been 
calculated for any given year. We address these problems individually, although the details are not 
explained here13.       
 
● Projected Government Debt 
 
The MOF provides the projected general account debt in the Cash Flow Projection of Government 
Debt Consolidation Fund (GDCF). This document presents the calculations of the outstanding 
amount of government bonds and so forth on the same basis as the Projection. However, as 
mentioned above, some old editions of the Projection do not treat the difference as the budget deficit; 
therefore, the meaning of this debt projection is also ambiguous. For this reason, in this paper, the 
projected government debt data are computed by adding the projected deficits for the current and 
next three fiscal years to the stock of debt at the end of the previous fiscal year, as calculated in 
Laubach (2003) (Table 2).  
 
● Projected Nominal GDP 
 
The projected nominal GDP data are built to be consistent with the Projection. First, we set as the 
benchmark the actual nominal GDP as of the end of the fiscal year preceding the last one. To obtain 
the projected nominal GDP in the current fiscal year, this value is multiplied by the growth rates of 
the previous two years provided in the Economic Outlook and Basic Stance for Economic and Fiscal 
Management because the Projection is based on this guideline for the government budget in Japan.  
Finally, to obtain the projected three-year-ahead nominal GDP, the current GDP calculated above is 
multiplied three times by the expected annual growth rate presumed in various economic planning 
reports such as the Reform and Medium-Term Economic and Fiscal Perspectives, which is utilized in 
the calculations of the Projection as well (Table 3)14. 
                                                  
13 The details are available upon request from the authors. 
14 We basically use the data in the Annual Report on National Accounts 2007 with the benchmark 
year of 2000. However, their contents do not go beyond FY2003. Therefore, we estimate the 
nominal GDPs in FY2004–2006 on basis of the growth rates in the Quarterly Estimates of GDP 
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 ● Projected Deficit-to-GDP Ratio and Projected Debt-to-GDP Ratio 
 
For the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio and the projected debt-to-GDP ratio, we simply use the ratio 
of the projected deficit and debt to the projected nominal GDP. 
 
(2) Long-term Interest Rates 
 
 For the nominal long-term interest rates, we use the closing yields of 10- or 5-year JGBs as of the 
day on which the Diet submits the government draft budget to the budget committee of the House of 
Representatives.  
Since the projected value of government debt is computed at the end of each fiscal year, it might be 
desirable to use the yield data as of March 31. However, there are at least two reasons why this yield 
should not be used. First, it would be rather difficult to detect the effects of the fiscal variables on the 
long-term interest rates should certain events, such as monetary intervention, occur between the day 
of submission and March 31. Second—if market participants are rational—once news is announced, 
interest rate changes would instantaneously reflect the news, on the day of its announcement.  
It is possible to take the closing yield of newly issued 10-year government bonds as the 10-year 
JGB rate; however, it may be undesirable to use that of 5-year government bonds, since 5-year JGBs 
were not issued before February 2000. Therefore, as a proxy, we use the rate of the 10-year JGBs 
whose time to maturity is less than and closest to 5 years. For the closing yield data, we basically use 
the data from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. However, since the Tokyo Stock Exchange stopped their 
pricing in November 1999 due to the institutional change carried out by the government, we use the 
data provided by the Japan Bond Trading Co. for the remaining periods. 
 
(3) Others 
 
● Trend Growth 
 
We use the GDP growth rate used in the calculations of the Projection and printed in various 
economic planning reports such as the Reform and Medium-Term Economic and Fiscal 
Perspectives.  
 
● Expected Inflation 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Jan–Mar 2007 (The Second Preliminary). 
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The expected inflation rate is estimated using Kanoh’s (2006) method, which in turn, is based on 
the Carlson-Parkin method (Carlson and Parkin (1975)). The survey data is obtained from Consumer 
Confidence Survey, and the deflator of household consumption provided in National Accounts is 
adopted as the price level.  
Note that until a few years ago, the Consumer Confidence Survey was only published on a 
quarterly basis and issued in March, June, September, and December. On the other hand, the 
Projection is published on a yearly basis, and it is typically issued in January. Therefore, we use the 
data from the December issues of the Consumer Confidence Survey on the assumption that these 
provided the best available forecasts when the Projection was published. However, for the years in 
which the Projection was issued in May rather than in January, the data are taken from the March 
issue of the Consumer Confidence Survey. 
 
● Equity Premium 
 
The equity premium, used as a proxy for risk aversion, is calculated using Laubach’s (2002) 
method. In detail, it is computed as the dividend component of national income and expressed as a 
percent of the market value of the stocks and other equities held (directly or indirectly) by 
households, minus the real 5- or 10-year JGB yield for the independent variable, plus the trend 
growth rate. Similar to the case of the expected inflation, we use the value of the equity premium in 
the quarter preceding the release of the respective budget projections15. 
  
 
4 Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Significance and Magnitude of Expected Fiscal Variables 
 
Prior to discussing the estimation results, we summarize the estimation method. The estimation is 
performed through the generalized method of moments with the Newey-West Heteroskedasticity 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Estimator. The order of serial correlation varies from 0 to 3, 
since Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) states that we should use a fractional power of the sample 
size—specifically, one-third—as the lag length. As the instrumental variables, we employ the 
dependent variable, the independent variables, and their squares. To ensure that the moment 
condition holds, the order of the lags of instruments is determined to equal the order of the serial 
                                                  
15 Similar to the nominal GDP, we use the growth rates of the relevant variables provided in the 
Quarterly Estimates of GDP Jan–Mar 2007 (The Second Preliminary) to obtain the values for 2004 
and 2005. 
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correlation plus one. Annual data is used, and the sample period is from FY1981—when the 
Projection was first published—to FY2006.  
The estimation results are summarized in Table 4. In this table, we present the benchmark cases, in 
which the significant levels set in the over-identification test (Hansen’s J-statistics) are maximum 
within the cases of various serial correlations16. As is clearly evident, the projected fiscal variables 
are positive and significant in all the cases, whereas the current ones are not in three of the four cases. 
Even in the case in which the current deficit is significant, its t-value is smaller than that of the 
projected deficit. Therefore, we can conclude that the results obtained on the basis of Japanese data 
are consistent with those of the second generation studies, i.e., the expectations pertaining to fiscal 
variables affect real interest rates more than the current ones.   
Next, we will discuss the magnitude of the coefficients mentioned in section 2.2.3. Since most of 
the results where the fiscal variables hold their current values are insignificant, we concentrate on the 
cases in which the projected values are used. With regard to the deficit, a percentage point increase 
in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio raises the real 10-year interest rate by 35 basis points and the 
real 5-year rate by 42 basis points. Similarly, with regard to the debt, a percentage point increase in 
the projected debt-to-GDP ratio raises the real 10-year rate by four basis points and the real 5-year 
rate by five basis points. We should emphasize here that the latter results are consistent with the 
Parable of Debt Fairy in Ball and Mankiw (1995) mentioned in section 2.2.317. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the Parable of Debt Fairy is a suitable benchmark even for the Japanese economy.  
 
4.2 Budget Deficit vs. Government Debt 
 
As mentioned in section 2.2.3, the relative importance of budget deficits and debt is still 
controversial. Engen and Hubbard (2004) insist that a budget deficit simply reflects a change in the 
government debt, whereas Feldstein (1986) concludes that budget deficits affect real interest rates 
more than the government debt. In table 4.2, we test this point with Japanese data. 
The first two columns in Table 5 present the estimation results including both the fiscal variables 
as independent variables. The deficit-to-GDP ratio has a larger coefficient than the debt-to-GDP ratio 
in both cases, which implies that budget deficits have stronger effects on real interest rates as 
compared with debt, as Feldstein (1986) mentioned. The last two columns show the results, in which 
we use the change in the interest rate instead of the level, similar to Engen and Hubbard (2004). We 
find that these regressions have little power of explanation. 
It should be noted that a positive significant coefficient of the deficit is not obtained, even in the 
                                                  
16 All estimation results are available on request. 
17 The fact that the coefficients on 5-year rate are larger than those on 10-year rate is consistent with 
the fact that the duration of JGBs is about five years, derived by Doi (2004).  
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original paper of Engen and Hubbard (2004). On the contrary, they show a positive significant 
coefficient of deficit when the Treasury rate level is employed as a dependent variable, similar to the 
present paper. Although they attribute this phenomenon to the fact that the published forecasts of 
budget deficit that they use are strongly correlated with those of government debt, it is not 
comprehensible why they precondition it with the statement that budget deficits are just the 
differences in debt. In contrast, the rationale in Feldstein (1986) is well-founded and consistent with 
the estimation results in Engen and Hubbard (2004) as well as in ours. In short, we should consider 
that budget deficits have stronger effects on real interest rates than do the government debt.  
 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 In the present paper, we analyzed the effects of the budget deficits and debt of the Japanese central 
government on the real long-term interest rates in Japan. Most of the previous studies that have 
examined these effects have used US data only, and exceptional studies on the world’s second largest 
economy do not utilize the knowledge gained from these studies. The primary contribution of this 
paper is to analyze the above effects with respect to the Japanese economy through the use of 
contemporary methods.  
The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, similar to the previous literature on the US 
economy, the present study on the Japanese economy shows that not the current but rather the 
projected fiscal variables have positive and significant effects on real long-term interest rates. This 
result is consistent with those obtained in the previous studies such as Feldstein (1986), Engen and 
Hubbard (2004), and so forth, which emphasize the importance of the expectations pertaining to 
fiscal variables. Second, a percentage point increase in the projected deficit-to-GDP ratio raises the 
real 10-year interest rate by 35 basis points and the real 5-year interest rate by 42 basis points. 
Similarly, a percentage point increase in the projected debt-to-GDP ratio causes an increase of four 
basis points in the real 10-year interest rate and five basis points in the real 5-year interest rate. The 
latter result is consistent with the often-cited benchmark of the Parable of Debt Fairy in Ball and 
Mankiw (1995), implying that a percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio effects, at most, a 
single-digit-basis-point rise in the interest rate in the Japanese economy. Therefore, we can conclude 
that this Parable is a good benchmark even in the Japanese economy. Finally, the result that budget 
deficits have larger effects than government debt in the Japanese economy was consistent with that 
of Feldstein (1986).  
Further examinations are left for future studies. As Thorbecke (1994) and Laubach (2003) 
mentioned, the associations between budget deficits or debt and interest rates might be revealed 
more clearly and significantly if we eliminate the effect of the business cycle. Using the implied 
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forward rate might be effective. In addition, we should consider the indebtedness of some special 
accounts and local governments, although no published forecasts for these accounts currently exist. 
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Table 1 The Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives in FY2006 
 
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009
18.4 18.8 18.9 19.6 20.6
16.1 14.6 17.0 17.5 17.7
47.3 46.4 47.4 48.0 51.5
Social Security Related Expenditures 20.4 20.6 21.4 22.4 25.8
Public Works Related Expenditures 7.5 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.0
Others 19.4 18.6 18.8 18.6 18.7
0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
82.2 79.7 83.3 85.2 89.8
44.0 45.9 48.8 49.7 50.6*
3.8 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.2
47.4 49.7 52.1 52.9 53.8*
34.4 30.0 31.2 32.3 36.0*
* : The case that the state contribution ratio to basic pension benefits is not raised to on half. 
Total(1)
Expenditures
Govenment Debt Service
Local Allocation Tax Grants
General Expenditures
Subsidies for Redemption of NTT Interest-Free
Loans(B-Type)
Difference
Total(2)
Revenues
Tax Revenue
Other Revenue
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Table 2 Historical changes in the definition in the Projection of the Budget’s Effects on Outlays and 
Revenues 
 (Predecessor: the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives） 
 
Cases
1981 1/30 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 135900 1231498
1982 1/29 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 97800 1238834
Case A 192400 1646872
Case B 195400 1651472
Case C 196700 1653372
Case A 168700 1718647
Case B 200500 1767047
1985 1/30 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 155800 1790536
1986 1/31 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 147900 1875174
1987 2/4 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 142100 1977677
1988 1/29 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 125100 1981503
1989 2/15 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 104400 1953613
1990 3/7 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 83100 1932732
1991 1/30 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 79500 1961909
1992 1/30 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 99800 2087773
1993 1/27 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 115900 2216681
1994 5/17 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 155700 2528323
1995 1/25 the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives 176900 2752926
Case 1 256700 3190937
Case 2 264100 3205037
Case 3 266500 3208837
Case 1 224400 3258851
Case 2 238400 3286651
155000 3231875
159000 3235875
164000 3240875
141000 3207875
146000 3212875
150000 3216875
286000 4138491
301000 4167491
316000 4197491
292000 4152491
307000 4181491
323000 4212491
Case 1 374000 4666687
Case 2 356000 4631687
Benchmark 383000 5028547
Assumption 1 373000 5007547
Assumption 2 416000 5095547
Case 1 420000 5398341
Case 2 392000 5350341
Case 1 429000 5850991
Case 2 455000 5891991
Benchmark 428000 6155736
Reference 1 469000 6239736
Reference 2 452000 6195736
Benchmark 406000 6491137
Reference 454000 6589137
Benchmark 360000 6659724
Reference 405000 6734724
Case 1 307000 6544988
Case 2 314000 6557988
others
the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives
the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives
the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives
others
Nominal Growth = 1.75%
Nominal Growth = 3.5%
others
Nominal Growth = 1.75%
Nominal Growth = 3.5%
the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives
the Projection of the Budget's Effects on Outlays and Revenues
the Projection of the Budget's Effects on Outlays and Revenues
the Projection of the Budget's Effects on Outlays and Revenues
2/2
1/241997
1996 1/26
1/211998
1/221999
2002
2/7
2/8
2000
2001
2003
the Medium-Term Fiscal Perspectives
2/5
1/232004
the Projection of the Budget's Effects on Outlays and Revenues
the Projection of the Budget's Effects on Outlays and Revenues
the Projection of the Budget's Effects on Outlays and Revenues
2/101984
2/31983
Fiscal Year
Date of
Submittion
to the
Budget
Committee
Proj.
Deficits
at t+3
Proj.
Debt
at t+3
Name
1/282005
1/252006
1/312007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20
Table 3 Projected Nominal GDP 
 
Cases t-2 to t-1 t-1 to t t to t+1 t+1 to t+2 t+2 to t+3
1981 225237.2 4.80% 5.30% 1.517 341778.025
1982 246266.4 7.00% 8.40% 1.523 375025.31
1983 261914.3 5.10% 5.60% 1.322 346213.055
1984 274572.2 4.50% 5.90% 1.337 367043.584
1985 286278.2 6.50% 6.10% 1.365 390752.795
1986 306809.3 5.70% 5.10% 1.342 411713.442
1987 327433.2 4.40% 4.60% 1.319 431920.402
1988 341920.5 4.10% 4.80% 1.256 429359.424
1989 359508.9 5.40% 5.20% 1.274 458171.522
1990 386736.1 6.40% 5.20% 1.287 497547.073
1991 414742.9 7.20% 5.50% 1.300 539123.546
1992 449997.1 5.50% 5.00% 1.273 572945.838
1993 472261.4 3.00% 4.90% 1.251 590694.681
1994 483837.5 1.10% 3.80% 1.215 587781.526
1995 480661.5 1.90% 3.60% 1.222 587409.781
1996 491267.5 0.90% 2.70% 1.149 564417.789
Case 1 499984.2 1.172 585814.154
Case 2 499984.2 1.113 556598.543
Case 1 514227.2 1.088 559692.415
Case 2 514227.2 1.146 589070.422
Case 1 520535.3 1.035 538962.262
Case 2 520535.3 1.090 567252.152
Case 1 512502.5 1.113 570475.382
Case 2 512502.5 1.058 542024.743
Benchmark 508005.2 1.072 544490.174
Assumption 1 508005.2 1.104 560662.108
Assumption 2 508005.2 1.072 544490.174
Case 1 513170.2 0.982 503828.913
Case 2 513170.2 1.25% 1.029 527992.391
Case 1 500967.6 0.50% 1.50% 2.50% 1.037 519616.022
Case 2 500967.6 0.992 496965.871
Benchmark/reference1 497203.1 1.25% 2.00% 2.50% 1.065 529484.238
Reference 2 497203.1 1.006 500188.805
2005 501253.5 0.80% 1.30% 1.084 543160.164
2006 505850.2 1.60% 2.00% 1.100 556309.338
Case 1 510968.0 2.50% 2.90% 3.20% 1.129 576938.541
Case 2 510968.0 2.20% 2.20% 2.20% 1.107 565800.467
1997
Fiscal
Year
2000
2001
2007
2004
2002
2003
6.50%
6.50%
Proj. NominalGrowth Rate
(t-2 to t-1, t-1 to t)
Planned Nominal Growth Rate
(t to t+1, t+1 to t+2, t+2 to t+3)
11.20%
9.50%
6.00%
6.50%
6.50%
4.80%
4.75%
4.75%
4.75%
4.75%
5.00%
2.50% 3.10% 3.50%1.75%
2.40% 1.75%3.50%
5.00%
5.00%
3.50%
-0.40% 0.80% 3.50%1.75%
0.00% 1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
2.00%
-2.40% -0.90% 0.50% 2.50%
-0.60% -0.20% 0.00%
0.10% 0.50% 0.00%
2.00%
2.00%
1.50% 2.20%
Actual
Nominal
 GDP at t-2
Proj.
Nominal
Growth Rate
(t-2 to t+3)
Proj.
Nominal
GDP
at t+3
1999
1998
-2.20% 0.50% 1.75%3.50%
0.90%
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Dependent Variable
The order of serial correlation
Constant -0.0193 *** 0.0099 -0.0354 *** -0.0176
-3.1589 1.4650 -4.8494 -1.2303
Projected Deficit/GDP 0.3492 *** 0.4251 ***
6.7644 6.7088
Current Deficit/GDP -0.0223 0.3699 **
-0.2638 2.0265
Trend Growth 1.4746 *** 0.9914 *** 1.5498 *** 1.0040 ***
9.2132 7.8317 9.7311 3.1854
Equity Premium -0.0113 *** -0.0041 0.0062 0.0126
-2.7146 -1.6393 1.6124 1.1487
Expected Inflation 0.7643 *** 0.5593 *** 0.9102 *** 1.1906 ***
10.2737 7.4802 11.8648 7.9022
R Squared 0.9210 0.9356 0.9278 0.8342
SL of Hansen's J 0.6240 0.6516 0.5822 0.5752
Dependent Variable
The order of serial correlation
Constant -0.0455 *** 0.0030 -0.0646 *** -0.0157
-2.7654 0.1238 -3.7245 -0.3127
Projected Debt/GDP 0.0381 *** 0.0486 ***
3.3349 2.9384
Current Debt/GDP 0.0054 0.0159
0.3097 0.3440
Trend Growth 2.1060 *** 1.1275 ** 2.1592 *** 1.1683
5.9653 2.2984 6.7513 1.3014
Equity Premium -0.0199 ** -0.0087 ** -0.0039 0.0165
-2.0429 -1.9305 -0.2551 0.7466
Expected Inflation 0.5955 *** 0.5948 *** 0.8256 *** 0.8698 ***
5.3413 6.1044 5.5907 4.3005
R Squared 0.8783 0.9066 0.9230 0.8809
SL of Hansen's J 0.7142 0.6628 0.5690 0.5176
10-year Yield 5-year Yield
Table 4：Effects of Deficit/GDP or Debt/GDP on the Current Long-Term Rate.
32
10-year Yield 5-year Yield
2 2
2
Note : Sample period is FY1981 to FY2007. Absolute value of t-statistics is under the GMM coeficient. We
here choose the case of maximum significant level of the overidentification test (SL of Hansen's J) from the
cases of various order of sereal correlation.
1 2 2
***Significant at the 0.01 level.
**  Significant at the 0.05 level.
*   Significant at the 0.01 level.
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 The order of serial correlation
Constant -0.0168 *** -0.0672 *** -0.0071 -0.0239
-3.7833 -7.3644 -0.5570 -1.3021
Projected Deficit/GDP 0.1670 *** 0.2644 ** 0.1897 0.4473 **
2.8155 2.0497 1.2438 2.1687
Projected Debt/GDP 0.0066 0.0340 ***
1.2253 3.8584
Trend Growth 1.5180 *** 2.2078 *** -0.1695 0.0429
13.8676 11.4950 -0.7535 0.1185
Equity Premium -0.0106 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0006 -0.0063
-4.8275 -2.7212 -0.1675 -1.5202
Expected Inflation 0.5638 *** 0.8759 *** 0.2834 ** 0.6008 ***
10.6670 11.8201 2.5192 3.2818
R Squared 0.9235 0.9109 -0.0354 -0.0274
SL of Hansen's J 0.5550 0.4684 0.7488 0.8642
3 2 23
See notes to Table 4
Table 5：Tests for the relative importance between deficits and debt
Level ofDependent Variable 10-year Yield 5-year Yield 10-year Yield 5-year Yield
Change in
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